Joining Mr. Dorsett is 7-generation rancher STEVEN ANDERSON to help citizens everywhere comprehend the negative economic, political, health and environmental issues surrounding this “Bio-Dealth Lab”.

Related Article: Disease lab likely to be in Kansas
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-01-11-footinmouth_N.htm

I guess it would be helpful to state that I don’t live in Kansas so your accusations of “NIMBYism” are misplaced.

Again, I will respond to your comments point-by-point.

1) Mechanical Transmission of live FMD. Reference: Foreign Animal Diseases: 7th edition published by the US Animal Health Assn. in 2008. Page 264: “the potential for humans to harbor the FMDV in their respiratory tract has been investigated. It was noted that FMDV can be carried for a short period in the throats of people. Sampling of human subjects who had been in isolation rooms containing FMDV-infected animals demonstrated that the virus could be recovered from the nose, throat and saliva of 7-8 people up to 24 hours after immediately exiting the room.” In the history of accidental releases of FMD from bio-containment facilities, the overwhelming majority have ocurred due to human error.

2) Inapt comparison of Human HIV to FMD. You say that humans produce billions of HIV virus particles a day. So what? Folks don’t transmit HIV to each other through aerosolization the way swine and cattle transmit FMDV to susceptible species. Again, citing the text above on p. 264: “Pigs are notorious for excreting large amounts of FMDV (estimated at 10 million to 10 billion infective doese per day).”

3) Protective measures can fail. While the risk is small, the GAO and others have cited the number of bio-containment laboratory errors over the past few years. Engineering can mitigate risk, but it cannot eliminate those risks. That axiom should be considered before moving live-virus FMD research to Kansas especially given the risk of tornadoes. June 2008 anyone? Moreover, Congress has stipulated that before any money can be spent on the design or construction of NBAF, DHS as must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that live virus can be safely conducted on the US mainland. Amazingly, this analysis was never even conducted before the proposal to build NBAF.

4) Funding for Foreign Animal Disease Research. I think you fundamentally miss my point here. Where is the consensus to fund these proposed programs? Who put Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia on the NBAF priority reserch list? Answer: it wasn’t USDA. Who seriously believes that such a program will be launched? If DHS deemed this a priority it could have started such a program at Plum Island – a facility it has owned since 2003. I could go on. Of the 10 diseases that DHS has proposed studying at NBAF – 8 of them can be studied at the current Plum Island facility. Why are they not being studied there? Why was ASFV research discontinued. If these diseases are such a grave, gathering threat, why must we wait until 2015 – at the earliest – to begin research on them when we have the capacity to study 8 of them now?
Again, Nipah and Hendra viruses were the only BSL-4 agents used to justify the current proposal. It is inconceivable that active research programs on these viruses will consume 50,000 sqare feet of BSL-4 space when CDC studies dozens of agents in about 1/2 that space.

5) I don’t there’s any comparison to Road/Bridge infrastructure proposals with NBAF. First off, the permanent positions are a “wash” with those that already exist at Plum Island and over 90% of the proposed NBAF mission can be accomplished there. The construction jobs can be used on any project – especially ones in states with higher unemployment, greater needs/population and, oh yes, less skewed towards a minority political party.

6) CDC Comparisons. What part of the terms “glove box” and “safety cabinet” don’t you understand? As I’ve said repeatedly, there is no comparison to small animal resaerch and large animal research. Just because you want something to be “fail safe” doesn’t make it so in reality. Accidents happen.

7) Public Policy concerns. I absolutely have questioned whether this research should be done at the scale proposed. We already have the capacity to do much of this work and it’s not being done and there has been no clamor in Congress, on the part of industry or the USDA to do it! The only clamor has come from DHS. If we are to do this resaerch on the scale proposed, we should conduct some analysis of how to go about it in the safest and most cost-effective manner. This analysis has never been done. NBAF was offered by DHS as a false choice – build it or live with Plum Island in its current state. This binary, false-choice ignored the host of options that range between: an expansion of Plum for BSL-3 work; BSL-4 work done in an expansion of existing BSL-4 facilities with a track record of safety; or a range of other options. None of this analysis was ever done. DHS presented a “take it or leave it” approach to NBAF. A good treatise on this discussion can be found on the following site. I recommend the first 30 or so pages:

http://documents.scribd.com/docs/bs61zwsdouufov79bi5.pdf

You praised our new President, but fail to address my question as to why this decision must be made on January 12, 2009 and published in the very last issue of the Federal Register published under this administration. Again, if this is a worthy project and the “obvious” choice for NBAF, why not let a new administration share in the decision? Sounds like a sure-fire way to show bi-partisan support to me. After all, it will be their FY 2010 Budget. Given the glaring errors, inconsistencies and ommissions of the NBAF Draft EIS (documented exhaustively in the link above), it is inconceivable that no public comment will be allowed on the final EIS exceeding 1,000 pages.

I think the real answer is that things aren’t as clear cut for Manahttan and NBAF after the “decider” – DHS Undersecretary Jay Cohen – leaves DHS next month. He has a pre-existing relationship with Tom Thornton. Thornton will have considerably less influence with a new “decider.”

Dismissal of the Texas Farm Bureau. This is just the latest group to question the decision to move live-virus FMD to the US mainalnd. They join the proud ranks of the Nebraska Independent Cattlemen and National Grange, among others, who question this plan. On a positive note, I’m glad you haven’t accused them of wearing “tin foil hats.”

“Given this reality, there is a chance (however slight) for mechanical transmission of the pathogen.”- Still the engineer. Any proof of this claim Handy Andy? Guess those degrees aren’t in logic.
“Pigs produce a tremendous amount of virus in their respiratory tract – as much as ONE MILLION virus particles per liter of exhaled air.” – And humans can produce 10 billion virus particles of HIV per day so unless you have some sort of relevant comparison, stop trying to scare everyone with your all caps claims. And since you are such a great engineer, please tell us how you know these claimed high numbers of virus particles will overcome protective measures carried out by actual engineers.

“mistrusted government.” I don’t think that I do, though I do mistrust the motivations of some looking to make public policy decisions without sufficient discussion/debate/input “ – Welcome to the government and it sounds like you are doing a little dance around saying you distrust the government when they don’t take your viewpoints as fact. What about your motivations? How can everyone be sure you’re not just worried it will affect your property value or the bicycle parking at your favorite coffee shop?
Now, if the funding doesn’t exist for a real foreign animal disease “on the move” like AFSV – why do you think that this federal money will suddenly come from in a more austere funding/budget environment? – The same reason I think we will find an answer to the cost of healthcare. I like and trust our new President. You should to. You would not think we would be building roads and bridges in this austere funding/budget environment either.

“I don’t think you appreciate just how “big” 50,000 square feet of BSL-4 space is. Again, it is about twice the size of the BSL-4 space at CDC – a place that researches everything from Anthrax to Yellow Fever.”- I don’t think you appreciate how big Atlanta is, the fact that the viruses the CDC works with are highly contagious and can be easily spread by people and the fact that the facility is located in the near middle of the city. Plus, their facility is older and many improvements to the construction of BSL labs have been made since CDC was constructed. They have succeeded and so can NBAF.

“This is a serious question of public policy” – No it is not. You never once questioned whether or not the research should be conducted. You’re only worry is that it will be conducted near you and you don’t want it.

“Oh, one more thing, the Texas Farm Bureau just passed a resolution opposing the relocation of Plum Island’s activities to the mainland”- Of course they did, it’s a brilliant PR move. It makes TFB look bold to its membership on an effort that, if they were truly serious, they would have protested years before a site was selected. Next for the TFB, passing a resolution condemning drought.

Whoa! Hold on! Those are some mighty big accusations you are throwing out there re: those that have valid concerns about this move. I’ll let those personal attacks roll off and address your post in the following order:

1) I never pretended to be an engineer, though I do have 2 graduate degrees in other disciplines. It is an incontrovertible fact that a tornado touched down in June ONE BLOCK from the proposed NBAF site and there have been dozens in/around Manhattan since 1950.

2) Again, your continued (and tiresome) comparison of NBAF with CDC is inappropriate. For starters, animal research at CDC is performed within safety cabinets/gloveboxes and is done on small animals. There are no “gloveboxes” for cows, sheep and swine. The animal room itself is the “glovebox” and people have to work/walk/kneel inside of it. The volume of waste produced by, say, mice and rhesus monkeys is incomparible to a cow – let alone a room containing 25-50 of them for a vaccine challenge. Given this reality, there is a chance (however slight) for mechanical transmission of the pathogen.

3) Different species produce differing amount of virus – even when they have the same disease. Some species serve as amplifiers. A good example is the case of swine who are infected with Foot-and-Mouth disease. Pigs produce a tremendous amount of virus in their respiratory tract – as much as ONE MILLION virus particles per liter of exhaled air. Cattle are very susceptible to airborne transmission given the large tidal volume (big lungs) when they breathe.

4) You levied the charge that I “mistrusted government.” I don’t think that I do, though I do mistrust the motivations of some looking to make public policy decisions without sufficient discussion/debate/input – especially one as momentous as deciding to bring live-virus Foot-and-Mouth Disease onto the mainland eight days before the expiration of their Presidential appointment. What I did try to convey is the inconsistency between the goals stated by champions of NBAF and the current funding realities for foreign animal disease research. NBAF supporters have identified an ambitious list of 10 diseases which “may” be studied in an operational NBAF. Some of them are curious because an existing programs for one of these diseases – African Swine Fever (ASFV) – has been discontinued at Plum Island. Plum Island had an active African Swine Fever program – with the facilities, space and experts until 2004, when DHS refocused its research priority and “zeroed out AFSV reaserch.”

Now, if the funding doesn’t exist for a real foreign animal disease “on the move” like AFSV – why do you think that this federal money will suddenly come from in a more austere funding/budget environment? If we can’t fund ASFV research, who will fund Nipah and Hendra research? As of 2008, there have been only four cases of Hendra virus reported in humans (two died). Are we really to believe that this will be funding priority in coming budgets? Color me doubtful.

I don’t think you appreciate just how “big” 50,000 square feet of BSL-4 space is. Again, it is about twice the size of the BSL-4 space at CDC – a place that researches everything from Anthrax to Yellow Fever.

So, I say again, if the justification for building 2x the BSL-4 space of CDC rests solely on Nipah and Hendra virus, what will be using all of that space for? This is a serious question of public policy, not “anti-government” paranoia.

Perhaps more to the point, why can’t we have this dialogue/discussion? If Manhattan truly is the “best” site for NBAF, why must the final decision be made on 1/12/09? If this truly is the best course of action, why can’t we rely on Governor Sebelius’ promises to “talk to Governor Napolitano” about how great a site Kansas is for NBAF and adequately digest the over 1,000 page EIS?

Oh, one more thing, the Texas Farm Bureau just passed a resolution opposing the relocation of Plum Island’s activities to the mainland.

http://www.gosanangelo.com/news/2008/dec/09/policymakers-eye-animal-id-program/